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Marlin Wayne DeWitt of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
DeWitt was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver, driving under the influence, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia following the stop and search of his vehicle. 
(R., pp. 5-7.) He pled not guilty to the charges and the matter was set for trial. 
(#34509 R., p. 30.) 
The day that trial was to commence, DeWitt expressed dissatisfaction with 
his retained attorney, Daren Fales. (Trial Tr., p. 7, L. 13 - p. 10, L. 19.1) The 
following colloquy occurred: 
MR. FALES: Your honor, my client arrived this morning and 
explained to me that he wished to obtain different counsel for the 
trial in this matter and that he's not satisfied with the way that I'm 
representing him. And so I thought that it would be appropriate that 
I bring that matter to the Court's attention, and so I did so in the 
presence of the prosecutor and your Honor. 
And I do not know exactly the specifics of the request, but I 
thought that my client should have the opportunity to bring that to 
the Court's attention. 
THE COURT: Mr. DeWitt. 
1 Four transcripts are included in the record on appeal. Citations to the transcript 
containing the majority of the trial proceedings are designated "Trial Tr.," and 
citations to the sentencing hearing transcript are designated "Sent. " 
state does not cite to the other transcripts in 
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THE DEFENDANT: I just don't feel I'm - he's working in my best 
interest. I have requested a couple things and neither one of them 
got looked up or checked on. I just don't he's doing me ... 
THE COURT: Well, you retained Mr. Fales to represent you in the 
case, correct, Mr. DeWitt? 
THE DEFENDANT: Pardon? 
THE COURT: You retained Mr. Fales to represent you in this case, 
didn't you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: Mr. Fales, are you ready - are you ready and 
prepared to proceed with this trial today? 
MR. FALES: Your Honor, I am ready and prepared to proceed. 
guess personally would [sic] rather not proceed with my client 
having that kind of attitude toward the proceedings. It does give me 
concem about my ability to have him cooperate with me in the 
conduct of the trial and how we should approach the issues that 
involve cross examination and argument to the jury. I do believe 
we are going to have some problems agreeing on how that should 
best be handled. 
I guess on his behalf, I really - I feel obligated to ask this 
Court to continue the trial at this point and give him the opportunity 
to obtain alternate counsel that he feels comfortable with. The trial 
will obviously be the most important stage of this process although 
we have gone through pretrial motion hearings and so forth, 
preliminary hearings, I guess I don't feel real comfortable 
proceeding at this point under these circumstances. 
(Trial Tr., p. 7, L. 13 - p. 9, L. 1.) The prosecutor opposed the motion and 
explained that it had subpoenaed three witnesses, including an individual who 
was driving from Coeur d'Alene. (Trial Tr., p. 9, Ls. 4-7.) The prosecutor also 
noted that the jurors had already been summoned and that the motion was late. 
(Trial Tr., p. 9, Ls. 7-22.) 
The court denied the motion, holding: 
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I'm also concerned with the 
at this point in time. I have got a jury - and that's 
been pending for quite sometime, I have got a jury panel that I have 
summoned in here to specifically to trial this is 
the time set aside to hear this trial, and for me be hearing about 
this now is simply inappropriate. And I still have be able to 
address it at this point in time and at this point in time I have not 
heard any specific grounds that would allow me to feel comfortable 
allowing Mr. Fales to withdraw. I have heard no grounds given 
from Mr. DeWitt other than general dissatisfaction that Mr. Fales is 
working in his best interest. 
I'm familiar with Mr. Fales, he's tried cases before me and 
done so in a very competent fashion before. We have proceeded 
through some pretrial motions raising some pretty legitimate 
grounds on this case previously, I have made my rulings on those 
pretrial motions, so I see nothing to support Mr. DeWitt's allegation 
that Mr. Fales is not working in his best interest. And with the lack 
of any specific grounds for that, I'm going to deny the request. And 
since this matter's been set to proceed to a jury trial today, that's 
what we're going to do. 
(Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 10, L. 19.) 
At trial, DeWitt was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p. 26; Trial Tr., p. 160, L. 1 - p. 161, L. 
5.) He was acquitted of driving under the influence. (Trial Tr., p. 160, L. 24 - p. 
161, L. 2.) The district court sentenced DeWitt to ten years with three years 
fixed. (R., pp. 25-28.) DeWitt did not appeal. (R., p. 33.) Following post-
conviction proceedings, in which the court granted relief, an amended judgment 
of conviction was entered. (R., pp. 33-34.) DeWitt timely appealed from the 
amended judgment of conviction. (R., pp. 35-37.) 
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ISSUES 
DeWitt states the issues on appeal as: 
1) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. DeWitt a full and 
fair opportunity to present the facts in support of his request for 
substitute counsel depriving him of his right to counsel protected by 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution as well as Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution? 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence upon Mr. DeWitt in light of the mitigating 
factors that exist in this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has DeWitt failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his last minute request to continue the trial so he could hire new 
counsel? 
2. Has DeWitt failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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I. 
Denying His Late Motion To Retain New Counsel 
A. I ntrod uction 
DeWitt claims that the district court erred in denying his motion for 
substitution of counsel because, he claims, the court did not afford him a "full and 
fair opportunity to explain the nature of the conflict" with his attorney. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) DeWitt has failed to show error in the district court's 
decision to deny his request, made on the first day of trial, to continue the trial so 
that he could retain new counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to grant a continuance rests within the discretion of 
the trial judge. State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 569 P.2d 916 (1977). To warrant 
reversal, the defendant must show prejudice from the denial of a request for a 
continuance. United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1988). Unless 
an appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of 
a denial of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that 
there was no abuse of discretion. State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 203, 485 P.2d 
144, 147 (1971). 
C. DeWitt Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
In Denying His Late Motion To Retain New Counsel 
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel encompasses two distinct rights: 
a representation and a right to choose one's own counsel 
5 
counsel is privately retained. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
(2006); United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th 
U 140 
2010). The 
adequate representation right applies to all defendants and "focuses on the 
adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such." 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 21 (1984). A defendant who can 
hire his own attorney has an additional right, separate and distinct from the right 
to effective counsel - the right "to be represented by an attorney of his choice." 
Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 at 147-48) 
(emphasis in original); see also State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 381, 247 
P.3d 582, 608 (2010) ("The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants in criminal 
cases the right to adequate representation and to a qualified right to choice of 
counsel, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no 
cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys 
appointed by the courts.") (internal citation omitted). 
However, the right to retain one's own counsel is not absolute. The 
Supreme Court has "recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right 
to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and against the demands of its 
calendar." Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 
U.S. 153, 159-60 (1988), and Morris v. Slappv, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983». For 
this reason, trial courts retain discretion to "make scheduling and other decision 
that effectively exclude a defendant's first choice of counsel." J.s;L In general, a 
defendant who can afford to hire counsel may have the counsel of his choice 
unless "the substitution would cause significant delay or inefficiency." Rivera-
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618 F.3d at 979. The delay that would result in this case 
of DeWitt's request justified court's decision to OeVVitt's 
trial so he could retain new counsel. 
Where a defendant seeks to retain new counsel, several factors are 
relevant: the timing of the motion; the requested length of delay, including 
whether the delay is an attempt to manipulate the proceedings; the number, if 
any, of similar continuances sought by the defendant; inconvenience to 
witnesses; any prejudice to the prosecution; whether an irreconcilable conflict 
exists between the accused and counsel; and the qualifications possessed by 
present counsel. State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. 
App. 1995); State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791,793,760 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Ct App. 
1988). Application of these factors to this case demonstrates DeWitt has failed 
to show error in the district court's denial of his request for a continuance so that 
he could hire new counsel. 
First, the timing of the motion supports the district court's denial of the 
motion for a continuance. DeWitt requested a continuance the morning that trial 
was to commence - witnesses had been subpoenaed and the jury had been 
called. (Trial Tr., p. 9, Ls. 4-15.) Second, DeWitt did not request any specific 
length of delay. There is no evidence in the record that DeWitt had retained new 
counsel at the time of his request to substitute his attorney and it would have 
taken new counsel some time to become fully familiar with the case. Further, 
although there is no evidence that De\Nitt had sought prior continuances, the 
record shows a continuance inconvenienced the state's 
witnesses, one of whom was traveling some distance for the trial. (Trial Tr., p. 9, 
4-7.) The state also represented that a continuance would be "a hardship on 
Idaho County to have to pay for more jurors to come back again for another trial" 
and it would cost money to "re-subpoena all [of the] witnesses." (Trial Tr., p. 9, 
Ls. 13-15.) 
The record also does not indicate an "irreconcilable conflict" between 
DeWitt and his attorney and neither represented to the court that communication 
between them had broken down. DeWitt simply asserted that he did not think 
that his attorney was working in his best interest. (Trial Tr., p. 7, L. 24 - p. 8, L. 
2.) Finally, DeWitt's attorney was well-qualified to represent DeWitt. The court 
noted that DeWitt's attorney had previously tried cases before him in "very 
competent fashion" and that his attorney had raised pretrial motions on "pretty 
legitimate grounds." (Trial Tr., p. 10, Ls. 10-16.) DeWitt's attorney also 
represented that he was "ready and prepared to proceed" to trial that day. (Trial 
T r., p. 8, Ls. 11 -1 2. ) 
There is no doubt that permitting substitution of DeWitt's attorney would 
cause significant delay or inefficiency. After hearing argument on the motion, the 
district court properly concluded that there was "nothing to support Mr. DeWitt's 
allegation that Mr. Fales is not working in his best interest." (Trial Tr., p. 10, Ls. 
14-16.) DeWitt has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his untimely motion to continue the trial so that he could obtain alternate 
counsel. 
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that d in 
as by =~-,-,--=.c...;;:...;...c:' 1 
him a and 
of his request for 
586, 181 3d 512 
2007). Lippert, however, addresses the situation where a defendant 
requests substitution of appointed counsel, and consequently involves a different 
Amendment right because, unlike a defendant has retained counsel, a 
defendant has no right to substitute his appointed counsel. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 
594-95, 181 P.3d at 520-21 (defendant must be given opportunity to show "good 
cause" for substitution of appointed counsel). Because DeWitt had no duty to 
show good cause to substitute counsel, any claimed lack of opportunity to show 
good cause is without merit. 
To the extent that Lippert may be applicable, De\Alitt received a "full and 
fair opportunity" to present facts in support of his motion. As discussed above, 
DeWitt explained to the district court that he had requested his attorney to do a 
couple of things and that neither of them "got looked up or checked on." (Trial 
Tr., p. 7, L. 25 - p. 8, L. 1.) The district court appropriately found that this was 
not a sufficient reason to continue the trial so DeWitt could substitute counsel. 
(Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 10, L. 19.) Because the district court inquired into 
DeWitt's reasons for wanting to continue the trial so he could substitute counsel, 
DeWitt has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion for substitution of counsel. 
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II. 
DeWitt Has F ailed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion In Imposing A Sentence Of Ten Years With Three Years Fixed 
Introduction 
DeWitt asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion in 
imposing a sentence of ten years with three years fixed. DeWitt acknowledges 
that the mandatory minimum sentence is three years but asserts that a shorter 
unified sentence is more appropriate in light of the fact "that this crime was his 
first felony conviction, the steps he has taken to deal with his drug addiction, and 
the support he has from his family and friends." (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) The 
district court considered these factors prior to imposing sentence. That DeWitt 
believes these factors warranted a lesser sentence does not establish an abuse 
of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. lsi 
C. DeWitt Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732,736, 170 P.3d 397,401 (2007). To 
establish that the sentence is excessive, DeWitt must demonstrate that 
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DeWitt has 
-I 
I 3d 
IS 
, and 
1. 
to demonstrate that the sentence he received was an 
abuse of discretion. A sentence of confinement is reasonable if "it appears 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution." 
State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 185, 857 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1993). A 
sentence need not serve all of the sentencing goals, or weigh each one equally. 
Id. 
Prior to imposing sentence, the court reviewed DeWitt's PSI. (Sent. Tr., p. 
11, Ls. 14-16.) The court noted that DeWitt seemed to have a "lack of 
appreciation for the serious nature of that trafficking offense." (Sent. Tr., p. 15, 
Ls. 15-16.) It also noted that the large quantity of methamphetamine and the 
scales found in DeWitt"s possession led to the conclusion that DeWitt was 
dealing methamphetamine and not simply using it, as DeWitt maintained in his 
PSI. (Sent. Tr., p. 16, Ls. 11-18; PSI, p. 3.) 
Contrary to DeWitt's contentions on appeal, the district court was aware of 
DeWitt's familial support prior to imposing sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-
11.) The court reviewed DeWitt's PSI, which included several letters of support 
from his family. (Sent. Tr., p. 3, Ls. 19-24; PSI, pp. 11-12.) 
DeWitt also asserts that he should have been granted more lenient 
a career criminal. (Appellant's brief, 11-12.) DeWitt fails to 
1 
recognize, however, that he was granted more lenient treatment than a career 
criminal. The maximum sentence upon a conviction for trafficking is life. I.C. § 
37-27328(a)(4)(D). DeWitt's sentence is significantly shorter than life, and the 
fixed portion of his sentence is the mandatory minimum. See I.C. § 37-
27328(a)( 4 )(A). 
Despite DeWitt's familial support and first-time felon status, the district 
court rightly focused on DeWitt's failure to take responsibility for his actions, as 
evidenced by his statement in the PSI that he "did not commit [sic] a crime, 
Officer Wilson violated my rights." (PSI, p. 3.) Given DeWitt's unwillingness to 
take responsibility for his actions and the large quantity of methamphetamine 
involved, DeWitt's sentence is not excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. DeWitt has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing a sentence of ten years with three years fixed upon his conviction for 
trafficking in methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Marlin Wayne 
DeWitt's conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 7th day of February, 2012. 
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